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THE CORNELISON DOCTRINE: A NEW
JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH*
INTRODUCTION
A state's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant falls into one of two categories. If the nonresident
defendant's forum-state activities' are wide-ranging, continuous,
and systematic, the state may assume general jurisdiction over the
defendant for all causes of action brought against him.2 This is
true even if an asserted cause of action has little or no connection
with the defendant's forum-state activities.3 If, however, the non-
resident defendant's contacts with the forum state are not extensive
enough to warrant -general jurisdiction, jurisdiction may be exer-
* The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to Professor Dar-
rell D. Bratton for his invaluable assistance.
1. As a prerequisite to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction, a non-
resident defendant must have had certain activities or contacts within the
forum state. The United States Supreme Court, in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), discussed the defendant's forum-state
activities and concluded that
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
2. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). In Per-
kins, the nonresident defendant mining company conducted continuous and
systematic corporate activities in Ohio "consisting of directors' meetings,
business correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of salaries, pur-
chasing of machinery, etc." Id. at 445. The cause of action, however, was
not related to any of these forum-state contacts. The Supreme Court never-
theless held that Ohio was not prohibited by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment from exercising jurisdiction over the defendant.
The defendant had, for all practical purposes, moved its operational head-
quarters to Ohio. Therefore, its forum-state activities had become so sub-
stantial that it could be made amenable to "a proceeding in personam to
enforce a cause of action not arising out of the corporation's activities in
the state of the forum." Id. at 446.
Additionally, Perkins does not compel a state to expand its long-arm
reach to such perimeters. The Court held merely that if a state desires
to so extend its jurisdictional arm, it would not be prohibited by federal
due process from doing so.
3. Id.
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cised only if the cause of action arises out of or is substantially
connected 4 with the defendant's forum-state contacts.5 This con-
cept is known as specific jurisdiction.
Until 1976, the exercise of in personam jurisdiction demanded
strict adherence to the rigorous requirements of these two categor-
ies. However, in Cornelison v. Chaney,6 the California Supreme
Court rejected this rigid mold, expanded the concept of specific
jurisdiction to its broadest constitutional reach, and thereby estab-
lished an important precedent in jurisdictional law.
The Cornelison case involved an automobile accident in Nevada.
The plaintiff was a California resident whose husband had been
killed when their automobile collided with the defendant's truck.
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff brought suit in California7 alleging
that the defendant's negligent driving caused her husband's death.
The defendant, a Nebraska resident, was a truck driver who con-
ducted his interstate trucking business by hauling goods through
several states. For seven years preceding the accident, the defend-
ant had delivered cargo into California. He made these deliveries
approximately twenty times a year, with each haul having an aver-
age value of $20,000. The defendant held a license from the Public
Utilities Commission of California to haul freight in the state and,
in the past, had also been employed as an independent contractor
by a California shipping brokerage firm.8  The accident occurred
near the California border when the defendant was hauling dry
4. The terms arising out of and substantial connection are synonymous
terms of art. They are often used interchangeably to describe the same
proposition-namely, that the cause of action came into existence as a result
of, and is closely related to, the defendant's activities within the forum state.
For an illustration, see note 13 infra.
5. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
6. 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976).
7. The plaintiff alleged that California had jurisdiction over the defend-
ant under CAL. Cirv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973): "A court of this state
may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution
of this state or of the United States." The plaintiff could also have insti-
tuted the suit either in Nebraska, the defendant's residence (subject only
to a possible forum non conveniens dismissal because none of the relevant
events occurred in Nebraska. See generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501 (1947)) or in Nevada, the site of the accident (NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 14070 (1969) permits service of process on an operator of a motor vehicle
who had been involved in a collision in Nevada.).
8. At the time of the accident, however, the defendant was not under
contract with this or any other trucking brokerage firm.
milk destined for Long Beach, California. On the return trip, he
had planned to obtain cargo in California to be delivered elsewhere.
In considering these California contacts, the Cornelison court
made two preliminary determinations. First, the defendant's Cali-
fornia activities were "not so substantial or wide-ranging as to
justify general jurisdiction over him."9 Second, the cause of action
did not arise out of or have such direct and substantial connection
with these contacts as to conform to the traditional requirements
of specific jurisdiction.10  Nevertheless, a 4-3 majority concluded
that in view of "all the circumstances, it would not offend due
process"" to exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant.
The Cornelison court thus unshackled itself from the bonds of
traditional jurisdictional restrictions. By assuming jurisdiction
under these facts, it expanded specific jurisdiction to its broadest
extent and set forth a new and important approach to jurisdictional
law.
The Cornelison formulation, however, implies an even more sig-
nificant development. The court's analysis suggests a flexible juris-
dictional approach based on the shifting interrelationships among
essential jurisdictional considerations, with the strength of one fac-
tor compensating for the weakness of another. It is this continuous
interaction and its jurisdictional consequences that constitute the
essence of the Cornelison doctrine.
THE ANALYsIs: STRUCTURING THE Cornelison DOCTRINE
Once the California Supreme Court determined that neither
general nor strict application of specific jurisdiction was appro-
priate, the traditional approach would have dictated a halt to
further inquiry. The defendant's forum-state activities were not
so pervasive as to permit adjudication in California over all causes
of action regardless of their connection with the defendant's con-
tacts. Furthermore, the cause of action asserted against the defend-
ant did not arise out of or have a substantial connection with his
forum-state activities in the clear and direct manner that the
United States Supreme Court in McGee v. International Life Insur-
ance Co.' 2 deemed essential. In McGee, the cause of action based on
an insurance contract was directly and substantially connected with
the nonresident defendant's soliciting of that insurance policy in
9. 16 Cal. 3d at 148, 545 P.2d at 267, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
10. See note 13 and accompanying text infra.
11. 16 Cal. 3d at 152, 545 P.2d at 269, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
12. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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the forum state.13 In Cornelison, however, the jurisdictional
relationship between the defendant's commercial contacts in Cali-
fornia and the wrongful death action resulting from his allegedly
negligent driving in Nevada was considerably more remote. The
Cornelison majority, in fact, admitted that "the connection [was]
not as direct as in cases such as McGee v. International Life In-
surance Co."'1 4 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that it could not
"overlook the fact that defendant's contacts with California, al-
though insufficient to justify general jurisdiction over him, [were]
far more extensive than those of the defendant in McGee."' 15 Ac-
cordingly, the court continued to pursue the jurisdictional inquiry.
At that point, the Cornelison majority began breaking new ground
in jurisdictional law.
The Cornelison approach was based on careful consideration of
three factors. First, the defendant was involved in a "continu-
ous course of conduct"'16 within the forum state. He had come
to California approximately twenty times a year for the past
seven years and, during that time, had conducted his trucking ac-
tivities under a California license. Such on-going activities were,
indeed, "far more extensive than those of the defendant in
McGee.' 7
Second, although the cause of action asserted against the defend-
ant did not arise directly out of or have a substantial connection
with the defendant's forum-state activities, the court nonetheless
found at least a rational connection-more properly, a rational
nexus' 8-between the cause of action and the forum-state con-
13. The defendant was a nonresident insurance company whose only Cal-
ifornia activities were the solicitation of a single insurance policy and re-
ceipt of the subsequent premium payments. When the California plaintiff
sued on this insurance contract, the Supreme Court held that a substantial
connection existed between the cause of action (suit on the contract) and
the defendant's forum-state contacts (solicitation of the contract in Califor-
nia and receipt of the premium payments). Consequently, the insurance
company was subjected to California jurisdiction.
14. 16 Cal. 3d at 149-50, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
15. Id. at 150, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
16. Id. at 149, 545 P.2d at 267, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
17. Id. at 150, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
18. The court, when describing this relationship, stated that "in our view,
[there is] a substantial nexus between plaintiff's cause of action and de-
fendant's activities in California." Id. at 149, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr.
at 356. It is submitted, however, that the term "substantial nexus" was
not meant to be synonymous with arising out of or substantial connection.
tacts.19 Two important considerations established this rational
nexus. The defendant's activities consisted primarily of his truck-
ing operations in California. In fact, the driving of the truck, the
very activity which gave rise to the cause of action, was "the essen-
tial basis of defendant's contacts with [California] ."20 Hence, a logi-
cal relationship existed between the cause of action and the forum-
state activities.21 The other consideration in creating the rational
nexus was that the defendant was hauling goods to California when
he collided with the plaintiff's automobile in Nevada. Therefore,
at the time of the accident the defendant had already-though
somewhat indirectly-commenced to further his commercial activi-
ties in the forum state by hauling freight toward California in anti-
cipation of economic benefit upon its delivery. Thus, a connection
can again be drawn between the cause of action and the defendant's
commercial activities in the forum state. When these two subfac-
See note 4 supra. It was used, instead, to describe a situation in which
a connection existed between the cause of action and the forum-state con-
tacts but was not as direct and substantial as the above two phrases suggest.
To avoid confusion (and because the author does not believe that there was
a substantial nexus), the term rational nexus will be substituted.
19. Speaking for the three dissenting justices, Justice Clark strongly crit-
icized the majority's finding of a jurisdictionally sufficient nexus between
the cause of action and the defendant's forum-state contacts. He based his
opposing view of a strict interpretation of the arising-out-of/substantial-
connection requirement.
The only conceivable connection between plaintiff's cause of action
and defendant's activity inside California is that defendant was
rolling toward (and plaintiff away from) its border. In this slight
sense, the accident arguably "arose" from defendant's business in
the state. However, the majority cites-and research has revealed
-no authority supporting the conclusion that such a tenuous con-
nection is sufficient to justify assertion of personal jurisdiction.
16 Cal. 3d at 153, 545 P.2d at 270, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 358 (dissenting opinion).
20. Id. at 149, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
21. See Threlkeld v. Tucker, 496 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1023 (1974). The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of California's jurisdic-
tional powers supports, by way of analogy, the Cornelison proposition that
a rational nexus can be found where the cause of action arises not from theforum-state contact itself but from an essential part of such activity. In
Threlkeld, a Connecticut resident instituted a number of suits in California
against his former wife. The ex-wife counterclaimed in one of these suits
and received judgment against her former husband for malicious prosecu-
tion. The former husband did not satisfy the judgment, and the ex-wife,
in a separate action, sued on the judgment in California. Although the ac-
tion on the judgment did not arise directly out of the former husband's liti-
gious conduct in California, it was nevertheless "only one step removed
from a diversity action upon a tort [malicious prosecution] committed by
the non-resident defendant in California, and it [was] closely related to an
elaborate course of forum-related activities carried on by the defendant."
Id. at 1104. Accordingly, the court concluded that the cause of action was
sufficiently connected with and arose out of the former husband's California
activities. As in Cornelison, the defendant's forum-related activities-re-
peated litigation-constituted the essential basis of the cause of action-suit
on the judgment against the defendant for malicious prosecution-and, as
such, the nexus between them was sufficient to permit the exercise of juris-
diction.
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tors combine, the resultant rational nexus between the defendant's
forum-state activities and the cause of action offers even more
support for the exercise of jurisdiction.
Third, the court considered whether it was "fair and reason-
able" 22 to subject the defendant to California jurisdiction "in light
of the inconvenience to [the defendant] in defending an action in
this state, when balanced against the interests of plaintiff in
suing locally and of the state in assuming jurisdiction."2 3 The
court, in balancing these factors of convenience, 24 found that the
scales tipped in plaintiff's favor. Although some of the witnesses
resided in Nevada, the plaintiff, who also witnessed the accident,
resided in California. Additionally, evidence of the amount of
plaintiff's damages was located in California.25 The multi-state
22. 16 Cal. 3d at 150, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
23. Id., 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
24. Some of the issues considered under this balancing-of-conveniences
test may be more appropriate for determining the applicability of the forum
non conveniens doctrine. See generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501 (1947). Although California recognizes forum non conveniens as a con-
cept independent of jurisdiction (CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 410.30 (West 1973)
and the judicial council's comments following thereafter), its courts have
nevertheless allowed factors of forum non conveniens to be jurisdictional
considerations as well. E.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.
2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Fisher Governor Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959). See Gorfinkel
& Lavine, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in California Under New Section 410.10
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1163, 1199 (1970); Morley,
Forum Non Conveniens: Restraining Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 68 Nw. U.L.
REV. 24 (1973); Note, Forum Non Conveniens in California: Code of Civil
Procedure Section 410.30, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 1245, 1255-56 (1970).
The Cornelison court fully intended this balancing process to be a part
of its jurisdictional analysis: "[W] hen, as here, justification for the exercise
of jurisdiction is not obvious, the convenience of the parties is a factor to
be considered in determining whether it would be fair to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a defendant who resides in another state." 16 Cal. 3d at 150-51,
545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 356. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior
Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969). Because justifi-
cation for exercising jurisdiction is never obvious whenever the Corelison
doctrine is used, the factors of convenience must always be jurisdictional
considerations. For the constitutional implications of incorporating factors
of convenience into the jurisdictional inquiry, see notes 91-98 and accom-
panying text infra.
25. But examine the logic behind this reasoning. If the trial is held in
California, the Nevada witnesses' testimony regarding the accident would
probably be presented by deposition. Concededly, "evidence . . . on the
amount of plaintiffs damages" was in California (16 Cal. 3d at 151, 545
P.2d at 269, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 357), and the plaintiff, herself a witness to
the accident, was available for in-court testimony. Nevertheless, it would
have been more reasonable, at least in the context of this subfactor, to ob-
nature of the defendant's business also weighed in favor of requir-
ing the defendant to defend the suit in California. Although the
court did not endorse a per se risk-of-doing-business concept,
20 it
nevertheless believed that because causing harm in a foreign state
was a foreseeable event inherent in the character of the defendant's
trucking business, the nature of his occupation should be given con-
sideration.27  Furthermore, the court reasoned that "from the per-
spective of a Nebraska resident faced with litigation outside his
state, there is little difference in the burden between defending in
Nevada or California. ' 2s  Finally, California had an interest in
providing a forum for its residents.20
The interplay of these three factors-continuous course of con-
tain the live testimony of the neutral Nevada witnesses on the substantive
issues of the case by opting for a Nevada forum.
26. Courts have disagreed about when litigation in a foreign state is part
of the nonresident defendant's risk of doing business. Generally, the an-
swer hinges on the nature of the defendant's business. See Gill v. Fairchild
Hiller Corp., 312 F. Supp. 916 (D.N.H. 1970), in which the court held that
manufacturers of airplanes and their component parts
must know that it is probable that the aircraft in which the parts
are used will be flown all over the United States .... The risk
of suit being brought against them in any one of the fifty states is
one of the risks that the defendants must bear because of the
nature of their business.
Id. at 918; Edmundson v. Miley Trailer Co., 211 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1973).
In Edmundson, the Iowa Supreme Court brought a Michigan defendant
within its long-arm jurisdiction. It was alleged that the defendant had neg-
ligently installed a trailer hitch on the Iowa plaintiff's automobile. The
resulting accident in Iowa was the only contact that the defendant had with
the state. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the defendant had put the
trailer and hitch . . . into the stream of commerce. The [defend-
ant] serviced an automotive product which obviously was going to
travel on the highways of the United States. It [was] reasonable to
assume all defendants should be subject to a lawsuit anywhere the
trailer and hitch would travel throughout the nation if they were
negligent.
Id. at 272. See also Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp,,
22 IIl. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). But cf. Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes
Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) where, in the court's famous
"tire hypothetical," fear was expressed that exercising jurisdiction under
these circumstances might inhibit the free flow of commerce. See
generally Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended
Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 544-60.
27. Also relevant in this consideration is the extent of the defendant's
interstate operations. See In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc.,
466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972), a holding which deemed pertinent the question
of whether the defendant had entered into out-of-state transactions only
occasionally or whether his operations had frequently extended across state
lines. See also Mountain States Sports, Inc., v. Sharman, 353 F. Supp. 613
(D. Utah 1972) ("[D]efendants are engaged in interstate business dealings
which suggest their general ability to litigate matters outside of [their state
of residence]." Id. at 616). See generally Currie, supra note 26, at 544-60.
28. 16 Cal. 3d at 151, 545 P.2d at 269, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
29. Id., 545 P.2d at 269, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
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duct within the forum state, a rational nexus between the cause
of action and the forum-state contacts, and matters of convenience-
provides the jurisdictional foundation for the Cornelison doctrine.
This interaction can be better understood by reading the Cornelison
case together with-the landmark decision in California jurisdictional
law, Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court.30
The Buckeye case involved a California plaintiff who had been
injured in California when a boiler, manufactured by an Ohio
defendant, exploded. The defendant's only California contacts,
apart from the presence of the exploding boiler, were sales of
pressure tanks to Cochin Manufacturing Company in San Fran-
cisco.31 For five years preceding the accident the defendant
had sold these tanks to Cochin. During the two previous years,
these sales had produced annual gross sales of $25,000 to $35,000.
However, the defendant had not sent the exploding tank to Cochin,
and neither party was able to establish how the particular boiler
arrived in California. Thus, the defendant's forum-state activities
were not sufficient to warrant general jurisdiction, and the cause
of action did not arise out of the defendant's activities with Co-
chin.32
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction
over the Buckeye defendant. The court found that the defendant's
sales to Cochin, coupled with the sale of the allegedly defective
boiler which somehow found its way into the state, constituted
economic activity in California "as a matter of 'commercial actual-
ity'.' 33 Moreover, the cause of action arose out of the defendant's
30. 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
31. "[The defendant] has no agent, office, sales representative, exclusive
agency or exclusive sales outlet, warehouse, stock of merchandise, property,
or bank account in California. It does not sell on consignment to, and has
no commission agreement with, any person or entity in California." Id. at
897, 458 P.2d at 61, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
32. Although the cause of action arose out of the explosion of one of the
defendant's boilers in California, the mere occurrence of the injury in Cali-
fornia was not, by itself, sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction.
See note 37 infra.
33. 71 Cal. 2d at 902, 458 P.2d at 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
A manufacturer engages in economic activity within a state as a
matter of "commercial actuality" whenever the purchase or use of
its product within the state generates gross income for the manu-
facturer and is not so fortuitous or unforeseeable as to negative
the existence of an intent on the manufacturer's part to bring about
this result.
Id., 458 P.2d at 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
activities in the state. Although the cause of action did not arise
out of the defendant's sales to Cochin, the court looked at the
defendant's total economic activity in California-sales to Cochin
as well as the direct or indirect sale of the exploding tank to
a California customer-and concluded that the totality of the sales
to California purchasers gave rise to the cause of action.34 Fi-
nally, the court balanced the convenience factors and the state's
interest in assuming jurisdiction and found them to weigh in the
plaintiff's favor.
A comparison between Buckeye and Cornelison will contrast the
underlying elements of the two decisions. In both cases, the
defendants were engaged "in economic activity within [California]
as a matter of 'commercial actuality'." 35 In each opinion, the court
determined that the factors of convenience weighed in favor of a
California forum. In Buckeye, however, the court found that the
cause of action arose out of the defendant's forum-state activities
in the strict McGee sense.36 This close connection was absent in
Cornelison.37
The Buckeye holding also presents procedural implications which
are equally applicable to the Cornelison doctrine. A two-step proc-
ess is suggested. First, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrat-
ing that the court may assume jurisdiction over the defendant. He
must establish that the nonresident defendant was involved in eco-
nomic activity within the state as a matter of "commercial actual-
ity"38 and must then make the jurisdictional connection between
34. See Gorfinkel & Lavine, supra note 24, at 1194-96.
35. 71 Cal. 2d at 902, 458 P.2d at 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 120. In Buckeye,
the defendant's economic activity within California, "as a matter of com-
mercial actuality," was evidenced by its sales of pressure tanks to Cochin
as well as the sale of the exploding tank which somehow found its way
into California. In Cornelison, this economic activity was established by
the defendant's California trucking activities, his license from the Public
Utilities Commission of California, and his previous employment with a
California brokerage firm.
36. See text accompanying note 34 supra, and see note 13 supra.
37. Another important distinction between Buckeye and Cornelison is
that in the former, the injury happened in California, whereas in the latter
the accident took place in Nevada. However, in Buckeye the mere occur-
rence of the tort in California was not, by itself, sufficient to warrant juris-
diction. Only if the requisite forum-state contacts, a substantial connection
between these contacts and the cause of action, factors of conveniences and
interests favoring a local forum, and lack of unforeseeability that its product
would arrive into the forum state are established, may jurisdiction over the
nonresident manufacturer be exercised.
38. The Cornelison proposition is not limited exclusively to commercial
contacts in the forum state. Activity within the forum state in a nonbusi-
ness context may also be relevant. See text accompanying note 71 infra.
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this activity and the cause of action. Once these facts have been
shown, the court will make an assumption of jurisdiction.
The second step shifts to the defendant the burden of rebutting
the propriety of this presumption. He must prove that although
jurisdiction over him may be assumed, doing so in this case is
neither fair nor reasonable. The defendant must therefore dem-
onstrate that his inconvenience in defending the suit locally is
greater than the interests of the plaintiff and the state in litigating
the matter in the forum state.39
The foregoing analysis creates a basis for defining the Cornelison
doctrine. The principle of the doctrine is that when a nonresident
defendant's forum-state activities are neither so extensive as to
warrant general jurisdiction nor so substantially connected with the
cause of action as to permit the exercise of specific jurisdiction in
the strict McGee sense, the defendant may nonetheless be subjected
to specific jurisdiction if the plaintiff can establish that the nonresi-
dent defendant has engaged in the requisite course of conduct
within the state,40 if the plaintiff can further show that at least
a rational nexus exists between the cause of action and the forum-
state conduct, and if the defendant is unable to demonstrate that
the factors of convenience, when weighed against the plaintiff's and
the state's interests in a local tribunal, favor another forum.
APPLICATION OF THE Cornelison DocTRmIE:
How FAR WILL IT REACH?
The Cornelison doctrine sets forth a flexible jurisdictional
approach. It is grounded upon the balancing of the three Corneli-
son factors to determine in each instance whether the exercise of
jurisdiction is appropriate. In order to illustrate this interplay and
to forecast the doctrine's reach, it is necessary to examine the
Cornelison proposition in terms of its application to a number of
fact patterns.
39. 71 Cal. 2d at 905 n.9, 458 P.2d at 66 n.9, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122 n.9. In
Buckeye, a products liability case, the defendant was additionally required
to show that the arrival of the exploding boiler was so fortuitous and un-
foreseeable as to "manifest lack of purposeful activity" in California. Id.
at 904, 458 P.2d at 65, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
40. The extent of the forum-state activities may be less than that needed
for general jurisdiction, but it must be more than that required for the tra-
ditional concept of specific jurisdiction.
The Requirement of a Continuous Course of Conduct Within the
Forum State
An interesting fact situation for examining a continuous course
of conduct within the forum state is presented by Dufour v. Smith
& Hammer, Inc.4 1 The plaintiff, a Maine resident, was injured
in a highway accident in Canada.42 The collision occurred as the
corporate defendant's 43 truck was approaching the Maine border
to pick up cargo in Maine. This particular shipment contract had
been arranged by a Maine brokerage firm. Shortly after the
accident, the truck entered Maine to obtain the cargo which it sub-
sequently delivered at its South Carolina and Georgia destinations.
The plaintiff brought suit in Maine, basing jurisdiction on the fact
that the cause of action arose out of the defendant's business trans-
actions in that state. To establish this connection, the plaintiff
argued that the "accident would not have occurred had it not been
for the arrangements made by the corporate defendant to receive
a truckload of potatoes [in Maine]." 44 The court, however,
rejected plaintiff's contention. The shipment contract that brought
the defendant into Maine,45 the court reasoned, was only a pre-
condition to the accident, not its cause.40 Furthermore, the events
relevant to the cause of action were the alleged negligence and the
resulting injuries, both of which occurred in Canada. Thus, the
court did not perceive the requisite causal connection between the
cause of action and the defendant's forum-state acts and conse-
quently dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. 47
41. 330 F. Supp. 405 (D. Me. 1971).
42. A Canadian plaintiff was also involved in this action. The court,
however, made no distinction between -the two plaintiffs, treating them as
one.
43. There were two defendants involved: the corporate defendant (a
trucking company) and the individual defendant (the driver of the truck
who was employed by the corporate defendant). The court's rationale,
however, was made applicable to both defendants.
44. 330 F. Supp. at 407.
45. The court assumed, for the purpose of argument, that the shipment
contract constituted transaction of business in Maine. Therefore, under the
then existing Maine long-arm statute, ME. REv. STAT. tit. 14, § 704 (current
version at ME. REv. STAT. tit. 14, § 704-A (Supp. 1976-77) ), if the transaction
of business gave rise to the cause of action, jurisdiction could be exercised.
46. Contrast this analysis with that of the Cornelison court in establish-
ing the rational nexus between the cause of action and the forum-state ac-
tivities. See text following note 21 supra. Note also that unlike the defend-
ant in Cornelison, the Dufour defendant was coming into the forum state
in performance of a shipment contract brokered in that state.
47. The plaintiff attempted to further bolster his arising-out-of argument
by showing that after the accident, the defendant's truck entered Maine,
obtained the cargo, and delivered it to its destination. The court, however,
summarily dismissed this contention on the grounds that the cause of action
[voL. 14: 458, 1977] Comments
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Under the Cornelison doctrine, the same result would have been
reached, but for a different reason. The Cornelison formulation
does not require a "direct causal connection" 48 between the cause
of action and the forum-state activities, but simply a rational
nexus. This rational nexus was present in Dufour.49 Rather, the
missing element was the on-going forum-state conduct that existed
in the California case. If the Dufour defendant's only contact
with Maine was the brokerage contract, this isolated contact was
not sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction. The Corneli-
son doctrine demands more. It requires that when the jurisdic-
tional connection between the cause of action and the forum-state
contacts is only a rational nexus, such a nexus be supported by
more substantial forum-state activities than merely an isolated
transaction.5"
The Requirement of a Rational Nexus and Matters of Convenience
and Interests
A starting point for an examination of the rational-nexus require-
ment is provided by a 1974 Pennsylvania case, Bork v. Mills.51
In that case the defendant's truck collided with the plaintiff's auto-
mobile in Virginia. The defendant was a Maryland resident who
conducted a portion of his trucking business in Pennsylvania. 52
The plaintiff was a Pennsylvania resident.53
arose before this event had occurred: "[A] cause of action cannot be said
to have 'arisen from' the transaction of any business occurring after the
cause of action arose." 330 F. Supp. at 407.
48. Id.
49. As in Cornelison, the driving of the truck, which constituted the es-
sential basis of the Dufour defendant's forum-state contacts, was also the
activity which gave rise to the cause of action. Furthermore, the Dufour
truck driver, like the Cornelison defendant, was en route to the forum state
where he was to obtain cargo for delivery elsewhere (although in Corneli-
son, the defendant was also hauling freight into the forum state for deliv-
ery). Thus, a rational nexus was established between the cause of action
and the Dufour defendant's Maine contacts.
50. For a case to which a similar analysis would apply, see Crimi v. El-
liott Bros. Trucking Co., 279 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
51. 458 Pa. 228, 329 A.2d 247 (1974).
52. The extent and frequency of the defendant's trucking operations in
Pennsylvania were not specified. The court, however, noted that prior to
the accident, the defendant's Pennsylvania trucking operations had been
conducted in such manner as to be considered "doing business" in Pennsyl-
vania under the then existing Act of July 1, 1970, Pub. I. No. 152, § 4, 12
PA. CONS. STAT. § 341 (repealed 1972).
53. Brief for Appellee at 2, Bork v. Mills, 458 Pa. 228, 329 A.2d 247 (1974).
On the basis of the defendant's trucking activities, the plaintiff
attempted to bring the defendant under Pennsylvania jurisdiction.
However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a 4-3 decision,
affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. Basing the dismissal
on lack of jurisdiction, the court stated that neither were the
defendant's Pennsylvania activities extensive enough to warrant
the exercise of general jurisdiction nor did the cause of action "arise
out of any business which [the defendant had carried on] within
the Commonwealth.154
If the Bork case had been decided under the Cornelison doctrine,
the same result would probably have been reached. Although both
the Cornelson requirements of a continuous course of conduct
within the forum state55 and the questions of convenience and
interests in subjecting the nonresident defendant to Pennsylvania
jurisdiction56 were determined favorably, the doctrine's rational-
nexus test remained unsatisfied. The problem in making the con-
nection between the cause of action and the defendant's commercial
forum-state activities stemmed from the fact that, unlike Cornei-
son, the Bork opinion did not specify whether the defendant
was on his way to Pennsylvania either to make a delivery or to
pick up cargo for delivery elsewhere. If he were not so routed,
this consideration, essential in establishing Cornelison's rational
nexus between the cause of action and the defendant's forum-state
contacts, would be absent in the instant case.57
The next issue to be examined is the Cornelison balancing of
convenience-and-interests requirement. A study of Odom v.
Thomas58 serves both to focus on this factor and to further
54. 458 Pa. at 231, 329 A.2d at 249. It was this conclusion to which the
three dissenting justices excepted. They believed that if a nonresident is
"doing business" in Pennsylvania (see note 52 supra), jurisdiction may be
exercised without imposing the additional requirement that the cause of ac-
tion arise out of such activities.
55. Because the defendant truck driver satisfied the Pennsylvania
doing-business requirement (see note 52 supra), apparently he also satisfied
Cornelison's similar continuous-course-of-conduct requirement.
56. The factors of convenience and interests appear to be the same as
in Cornelison. The Bork plaintiff was a resident of the forum state, and
therefore both she and the state had an interest in litigating the matter in
Pennsylvania. Furthermore, the defendant was engaged in interstate
business, a fact which suggests that litigation in a foreign tribunal was a
foreseeable event. Finally, a Maryland resident faced with the prospect of
foreign litigation probably perceives little difference in the burden of de-
fending either in Virginia or in Pennsylvania. (Note: Because the issue
of the availability of witnesses was not raised in Bork, it was omitted from
this discussion.)
57. See text following note 21 sup and text accompanying notes 64-
69 infra.
58. 338 F. Supp. 877 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
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analyze the rational-nexus criterion. Again, the suit arose out of
a highway accident. The automobile of a Texas plaintiff collided
in Arkansas with the truck of an Alabama defendant. 59 The plain-
tiff brought suit in a Texas federal district court. The Alabama
defendant's contacts with Texas were similar to those of the
Cornelison defendant. The defendant operated his interstate truck-
ing business in various states, including Texas. As in Cornelison,
the defendant had express authority from the forum state to haul
freight within its borders.60 Yet, despite the defendant's forum-
state contacts, jurisdiction was not exercised.
Both conceptual and factual differences distinguish Odom from
Cornelison. Conceptually, the distinction lies in the very different
judicial treatment of the similar "interests" present in both cases.
Cornelison held that "California [had] an interest in providing a
forum since plaintiff is a California resident."61 The Odom court
saw no such interest. Rather, the court believed that Arkansas,
the state in which the accident occurred, had stronger interests than
did Texas in granting relief to the plaintiff. Furthermore, the
Odom tribunal gave weight to the fact that Arkansas was "a neutral
jurisdiction with regard to plaintiff and defendants, and . . . [was]
located approximately midway between the respective states of the
parties. '62 In addition, the court reasoned that because Arkansas
substantive law was involved, the Arkansas courts could better
interpret those laws.6 3 Therefore, accepting the Odom view on the
weighing of interests and convenience, a balance favoring the exer-
cise of jurisdiction would be difficult to strike in any case in which
the injury giving rise to the cause of action occurred outside the
forum state.
Factually, the only major distinction between the Odom and
Cornelison situations was that, at the time of the accident, the
Odom defendant was not on his way to the forum state. As pre-
viously discussed, this factor was important in establishing the
59. Actually, two defendants were involved: the truck owner and the
individual driver. However, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, the
court treated the two defendants as one.
60. The defendant held a permit from the Texas Railroad Commission,
which licensed him to conduct the necessary portion of his interstate truck-
ing business in Texas.
61. 16 Cal. 3d at 151, 545 P.2d at 269, 127 CaL Rptr. at 357.
62. 338 F. Supp. at 879.
63. Id.
necessary rational nexus in the Cornelison ruling. 4 Although it
did not expressly state the proposition, the Odom court may like-
wise have understood the significance of this absent element. The
court's discussion of the "unbridgeable gap separating defendant's
activities in Texas from the incident involved in this litigation"0 5
was commenced by emphasizing that the defendant was not sched-
uled to haul freight through Texas during this particular trip.30
The actual weight given to this factor cannot be determined, how-
ever, because the court did not refer to it again. Instead, the Odom
court's remaining discussion of the arising-out-of issue came en-
tirely in response to the plaintiff's argument. The plaintiff con-
tended that in the instant case, as in products liability cases, the
defendant's knowledge that an accident might occur in the forum
state should be the major jurisdictional determinative. Therefore,
because the Odom defendant could reasonably foresee that an acci-
dent might result from his trucking operations in Texas, this fore-
knowledge should be sufficient to make him amenable to Texas
jurisdiction-even if the accident occurred outside the forum state
and the defendant was not, at that time, heading into the state.
The court, however, rejected the plaintiff's argument. It held
that because this was not a products liability case but rather
an ordinary negligence situation, the plaintiff's reasoning did not
apply.
The court's position was correct. In products liability cases, the
manufacturer purposefully sends its goods into other states for pur-
chase and use. It can foresee that shipping its products into
another state may result in the product injuring people there and
that litigation in that state may ensue. Therefore, if a defective
product manufactured in state A id shipped to and purchased in
state B and injures the consumer in state C, the nonresident manu-
facturer may be subjected to jurisdiction in state B. It is the manu-
facturer's purposeful activity in distributing the product in that
state and its knowledge that such activity may cause injury there,
64. See text following note 21 spra.
65. 338 F. Supp. at 878.
66. "Defendant's agent was en route from Alabama to Kansas by way
of Arkansas and Oklahoma. At no time during the pendency of this par-
ticular trip was [defendant's truck] to be routed through any part of
Texas." Id. at 878-79.
Texas appears to be the only jurisdiction where this element had been
a jurisdictional consideration. See Frye v. Ross Aviation, Inc., 523 S.W.2d
500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). It can thus be inferred that had the Odom de-fendant been on his way to Texas at the time of the accident, jurisdiction
along the Cornelison lines might have been exercised.
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rather than the place where the tort actually occurred, that should
be pivotal in determining jurisdiction.67
By contrast, in simple negligence cases, the wrongful act and the
resulting injury are not geographically separable. The defendant
does not purposefully extend his injury-causing activity beyond the
state in which the tort occurred. Unlike products liability cases,
the defendant cannot anticipate that his liability-producing conduct
in one state will result in injury in another. Consequently, in
ordinary negligence cases, the place where the tort actually occur-
red is the exclusive situs of the defendant's relevant activities and
is therefore of primary jurisdictional significance.
In the trucking cases, however, a special situation may sometimes
exist. If, at the time of the accident, the defendant was en route
to the forum state, the jurisdictional question can be analogized
to the products liability cases. With reference to the above prod-
ucts liability hypothetical, it should be recalled that it is the manu-
facturer's activities in a state and its knowledge that an accident
might occur there, rather than the place where the injury actually
occurred, that is of jurisdictional importance. Therefore, if a non-
resident defendant manufactures a defective product in state A,
ships it to state B-where the manufacturer has previously sold its
products-and, while en route to that state, the product injures a
state B resident in state X, jurisdiction over the manufacturer may
nonetheless be exercised in state B. The manufacturer, having
intended that this product should reach state B, could have foreseen
that this very accident might have occurred there. Therefore, when
considering that the defendant also had purposeful contacts with
the forum state and that this action had some relationship to its
forum-state activities, requiring the manufacturer to litigate this
matter in state B is not so unfairly surprising as to offend due
process. Likewise, a truck driver heading toward state B-where
he has regularly operated a portion of his trucking business-can
anticipate that he may be involved in a highway collision in that
state and that the injured resident may sue him locally. Thus, if
while en route to state B the defendant collides with the automo-
bile of a state B resident, defending the resulting law suit in state
B is no more unreasonable than in the products liability situation.
67. See Williams v. Brasea, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 658 (S.D. Tex. 1970). See
also Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 464, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d
8, 24 (1965); Currie, supra note 26, at 554-55.
Again, the defendant could have foreseen that this very accident
might have happened in state B had the collision occurred but a
few miles later. Furthermore, the defendant had purposeful con-
tacts with the forum state, and there was a rational nexus between
these activities and the forum-state contacts. Accordingly, the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant truck driver in state B
is fair and reasonable.
In Odom, however, the defendant was not en route to the forum
state. Although this was the kind of accident that could have
occurred in Texas, that very accident could not, during this particu-
lar trip, have occurred there. Consequently, the defendant's truck-
ing activities did not have the requisite connection with the cause
of action to support the exercise of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
court concluded that the instant case was merely a simple tort ac-
tion in which "the situs of the tort [was] of controlling signif-
icance" 68 and dismissed the complaint.6 9
The Cornelison Doctrine in a Social-Commercial Setting
To this point, the analysis has centered on purely commercial
involvement in the forum state. However, situations may arise in
which the defendant's business activities are of secondary impor-
tance. Assume that a Nebraska school teacher comes to California
each summer. For the past seven years, he has leased a summer
cottage in San Diego for a three-month period. During these three
months, he not only vacations in California but also attends a local
university to fulfill a Nebraska requirement that educators enroll
in summer graduate programs. This summer the school teacher
has routed his California trip through Arizona, where he had
intended to spend three weeks visiting relatives before proceeding
to California. While driving to Arizona, the school teacher is
involved in an automobile accident in Nevada with a California resi-
dent. The question then arises whether the Cornelison doctrine
would subject the school teacher to California jurisdiction.
68. 338 F. Supp. at 879.
69. See also Curran v. Rouse Transp. Corp., 42 isc. 2d 1055, 249 N.Y.S.2d
718 (1964). In Curran, a New York resident was involved in an automobile
collision with the Vermont defendant's truck. The defendant's trucks had
been coming to New York twice daily to provide mail service. The accident
occurred in Vermont, though it is not clear whether, at the time of the acci-dent, the defendant's truck was en route to or coming from New York in
performance of its mail service contract. Subsequently, the plaintiff
brought suit in New York. A New York court declined to exercise jurisdic-
tion because the defendant's New York trucking activities did not give rise
to a cause of action based on a Vermont highway accident.
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The answer is found in an examination of the defendant's
contacts with the forum state. It would seem that the defendant
does not engage in a continuous course of conduct within California
as a matter of commercial actuality, at least not in the manner
of the Cornelison and Buckeye defendants. Nevertheless, each
summer for the past seven years the defendant has purposefully
availed himself of the facilities and benefits that California provides
for those within its borders. He has enjoyed the state's privileges
and invoked the state's protections from civil and criminal harms.7 0
Furthermore, the defendant has attended a California university
to satisfy a professional requirement. Hence, through his associa-
tion with California, the defendant has attained economic benefits
by receiving the training needed to retain his present employment.
In view of the defendant's activities in both the social and commer-
cial context, his contacts more than satisfy the Cornelison require-
ment of a continuous course of conduct within the forum state.7 1
A more difficult task is establishing the rational nexus between
these California contacts and the cause of action. Unlike Corneli-
son, the driving of the defendant's automobile is not an essential
basis of the defendant's forum-state contacts. Even if it were neces-
sary for the school teacher to drive his automobile to California and,
once there, to continue to use it, driving is simply not as essential to
his forum-state activities as it was to the Cornelison truck driver.
Furthermore, in Cornelison the accident occurred as the defendant
was en route to California. But in the instant facts the defendant
was driving toward an Arizona destination, and only later did he
plan to resume his trip toward California. Consequently, the nexus
between the cause of action and the defendant's contacts with the
forum state is not as strong as in Cornelison.
The balancing of convenience and interests in the hypothetical
situation can be made along the Cornelison lines. The plaintiff is
a California.resident and, of course, California has an interest in
70. It is doubtful, however, that social contacts alone would be sufficient
to support jurisdiction in the Cornelison-type fact pattern. Because the de-
fendant derives no economic-or equally substantial-benefits from his
forum-state activities, subjecting him to California jurisdiction for such a
relatively remote cause of action would be unfair and unreasonable.
71. See also Threlkeld v. Tucker, 496 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1023 (1974), in which the defendant's forum-state activities were
in the litigious context. See note 21 supra.
providing a forum for its citizens in which to litigate their griev-
ances. However, an important makeweight in Cornelison, the
multi-state character of the defendant's occupation, appears to be
absent here.7 2 The implication in Cornelison was that because an
interstate truck driver could foresee the possibility of a highway
collision in distant states, defending such suits in foreign tribunals
would not be unreasonable. However, consideration of the inter-
state nature of the school teacher's annual trips, coupled with his
subsequent use of his automobile in California during his three-
month stay, would indicate that he, too, could reasonably anticipate
causing injury to residents in distant forums, and in particular to
Californians. Moreover, as in Cornelison, the defendant is a
Nebraska resident "faced with litigation outside his state . . . [for
whom] there is little difference in the burden between defending
in Nevada or California.173
Thus, while the nexus between the cause of action and the
defendant's forum-state activities is somewhat remote, the defend-
ant's rather extensive forum-state activities (though not sufficient
for general jurisdiction), coupled with the interest in and the rela-
tive convenience of a local forum, appear to compensate for the
weak nexus and permit exercising jurisdiction over the Nebraska
school teacher.74
Implications of the Cornelison Doctrine
After an examination of these four fact situations, two basic
conclusions may be made concerning the Cornelison doctrine. First,
as a prerequisite to jurisdiction, each of the three Cornelison factors
-continuous course of conduct within the forum state, a rational
nexus between the cause of action and the forum-state contacts,
and matters of convenience and interests-and their various sub-
factors must, to some degree, be present. This conclusion is high-
lighted by the trucking cases in which each fact situation lacked
72. See text accompanying note 89 infra.
73. 16 Cal. 3d at 151, 545 P.2d at 269, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
74. In this context, see also Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). In
Hess the Supreme Court allowed the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant whose only relevant formn-state contact was
an automobile accident. Therefore, if a state may exercise jurisdiction over
a motorist based on a single, fortuitous contact, it is at least as reasonable
to require the motorist to defend that suit in the state where he purposefully
conducted a continuous course of conduct. Thus, if the three Cornelison
factors have been met, subjecting the Nebraska school teacher to jurisdic-
tion in California-the state to which both parties have a closer relationship
than a mere casual automobile accident-would be as appropriate as requir-
ing him to defend the suit in Nevada, the site of the accident.
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a component that the Cornelson court deemed indispensable to the
exercise of jurisdiction.75
But a more important observation is suggested by the Nebraska
school teacher hypothetical.76 There the nexus between the cause
of action and the forum-state activities was not as direct as that
in Cornelson. However, because the Nebraska school teacher
spent one-fourth of each year in California, his forum-state con-
tacts, though not sufficient to merit general jurisdiction, were
certainly more substantial than those of the Cornelison defendant.
Therefore, as the extent of the defendant's contacts allowed Cor-
nelison to move away from the direct causal relationship between
the cause of action and the forum-state activities that the McGee
court expounded, likewise the more substantial nature of the hypo-
thetical defendant's contacts with California should justify the
exercise of jurisdiction even though the nexus is more remote than
in Cornelison.
This second observation marks the significance of the Cornelison
doctrine. It suggests a mode of jurisdictional analysis that is based
on the balancing of the three Cornelison factors to determine if
exercising jurisdiction is appropriate. If the factors of convenience
and interests weigh progressively more in favor of jurisdiction, as
the nonresident defendant's contacts grow from isolated forum-
state transactions to more wide-ranging activities, the connection
between these contacts and the cause of action needed to justify ju-
risdiction becomes less and less, until the conduct is so continuous
and systematic that jurisdiction over even unrelated causes of ac-
tion is warranted.
THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
The final issue to be resolved is whether the Cornelison decision
is constitutional. The California long-arm statute provides that
a "court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not
75. It is not suggested that the respective courts would have exercisedjurisdiction even if the absent factors had been present. To the contrary,
such a result, prior to Cornelison, would have been highly unlikely. It is
merely noted that each of the trucking cases can be factually distinguished
from Cornelison.
76. A similar conclusion may also be drawn from Threlkeld v. Tucker,
496 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974). See notes 21
& 71 supra.
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States. 17 7  With such sweeping language, California has adopted
the due process limits of the fourteenth amendment as its statutory
guideline. Accordingly, its courts' jurisdictional determinations are
constitutional in nature and must therefore be examined in light
of the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court.
Following its decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,78
the United States Supreme Court consistently extended states'
jurisdictional powers. 79  However, in the 1958 case of Hanson v.
Denckla,8 0 a divided Court"' interrupted this growing trend and
set forth express limits on the states' long-arm reach. Therefore,
the issue is whether the Cornelison decision stays within the consti-
tutional boundaries delineated by Hanson.
The subject matter of the Hanson controversy was a trust
instrument executed in Delaware by Mrs. Donner, a Pennsylvania
resident. Subsequently, Mrs. Donner moved to Florida. The
income from the trust was mailed to her Florida residence, and
from there she occasionally communicated with the Delaware
trustee regarding the administration of the trust. Upon her death,
suit was brought in Florida to determine to whom the trust corpus
would pass. The Delaware trustee was made a defendant, and the
Florida Supreme Court found that it could exercise jurisdiction
over it.
The United States Supreme Court, however, expressly rejected
Florida's claim of jurisdiction. The Court began with the premise
that, unlike McGee, the cause of action did not arise out of any
contacts which the Delaware trustee had with Florida. Further-
77. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
78. '326 U.S. 310 (1945). See note 1 supra.
79. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Traveler's Health Ass'n
v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). See generally Kurland, The Supreme
Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts, From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. Rav. 569
(1958); Note, Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 909 (1960).
80. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
81. It was a 5-4 decision, with Mr. Chief Justice Warren writing the
majority's opinion. The Hanson ruling has been criticized by a number of
courts and commentators, with a few jurisdictions taking the Hanson mi-
nority's fundamental-fairness approach. Casad, Long Arm and Convenient
Forum, 20 U. KAN. L. Rav. 1, 11-12 (1971). See Phillips v. Anchor Hocking
Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966); Reese & Galston, Doing an
Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L.
RaV. 249, 256-57 (1959); Comment, Tortious Act as a Basis for Jurisdiction
in Products Liability Cases, 33 ForDHAm L. Rav. 671, 685-86 (1965).
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more, the trustee did not "purposefully [avail] itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.18 2 Finally, the Court held
that despite Florida being the most convenient forum for litiga-
tion,8 3 jurisdiction could not be exercised absent the requisite
minimum forum-state contacts.
In light of these limitations, the Cornelison decision appears,
initially, to be of dubious constitutional validity. The cause of
action did not arise out of the defendant's forum-state contacts in
the clear and direct manner that the strict McGee view of specific
jurisdiction requires, and his forum-state activities were not sub-
stantial enough to support general jurisdiction. At this point, Han-
son would rule out jurisdiction, regardless of the other factors that
the Cornelison court so strongly emphasized.
If, however, the factual situation in Hanson was the determining
factor in the denial of jurisdiction,8 4 the Cornelison case can be
distinguished. Unlike Hanson, the Cornelison defendant purpose-
fully availed himself of the privilege of conducting his activities
in the forum state.8 5 Also, whereas Hanson involved an isolated
transaction in Florida,8 6 the Cornelison defendant had an on-going
82. 357 U.S. at 253.
83. Mrs. Donner and most of the interested parties (beneficiaries and ap-
pointees) were Florida residents.
84. Such a narrow interpretation is suggested by Phillips v. Anchor
Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966). See Foster, Ex-
panding Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents, 32 Wis. B. BuLL. 3, 20 (Supp. Oct.
1959): The Hanson case "very probably will be confined to its precise
facts." But see Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20 (1959):
It may confidently be predicted that the facts in Hanson v.
Denckla themselves mark the outer limits of permissible exercise
of judicial jurisdiction under the due process clause, and that the
exercise of jurisdiction will hereafter be sustained, in keeping with
the McGee trend, on sets of facts only narrowly distinguishable
from those in Hanson v. Denckla ....
Id. at 33-34.
85. The Cornelison defendant's forum-state contacts, as in Buckeye, were
sufficient to establish his California conduct "as a matter of commercial ac-
tuality." See note 35 supra. Because Buckeye had "equated engaging in
economic activity within [the forum state] 'as a matter of commercial ac-
tuality' with Hanson's requirement of purposeful activity within the state"
(71 Cal. 2d at 902, 458 P.2d at 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 120), it follows that the
Cornelison defendant had likewise satisfied Hanson's requirement of pur-
poseful conduct within the forum state.
86. "The defendant trust company ha [d] no office in Florida, and trans-
act[ed] no business there. None of the trust assets ha[d] ever been held
or administered in Florida, and the record disclose[d] no solicitation of
business relationship in California.8 7 Therefore, because the Han-
son Court dealt only with a single transaction and was not
presented with an on-going business relationship, its arising-out-
of requirement need not be as stringently applied in the latter cir-
cumstance. Thus a lesser connection between the cause of action
and a continuous course of conduct within the forum state-such
as a mere rational nexus-might be constitutionally sufficient to
support jurisdiction.
Commentators have also interpreted the Hanson decision as sug-
gesting that in order for a court to exercise jurisdiction, a non-
resident defendant must be able to anticipate that his forum-state
contacts might lead to litigation in the state.88 This requirement
was satisfied in Cornelison, for the very nature of the defendant's
interstate trucking business implied "the foreseeable circumstance
of causing injury to persons in distant forums."8' 9 But perhaps a
better response would be to merely reject this foreseeability test
as a major determinative and to consider it as simply another factor
to be weighed in the jurisdictional inquiry.90
A final obstacle must be overcome. The Hanson Court empha-
sized that a state "does not acquire ...jurisdiction by being the
'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient loca-
tion for litigation" 91 but rather by having the requisite forum-state
contacts. Thus, although considerations of convenience dictated a
Florida forum, because of the lack of the necessary contacts, the
Hanson Court did not allow these considerations to be factored into
the jurisdictional formula. Nevertheless, it appears that the Cornel-
ison court's use of convenience elements in its jurisdictional deter-
mination process can be reconciled with Hanson.
In Hanson, the factors of convenience were presented as the prin-
cipal justification for extending in personam jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant. But in Cornelison, these factors are treated
as an added requirement for the exercise of jurisdiction.0 2 Fur-
business in that State either in person or by mail." 357 U.S. at 251. The
defendant's only Florida contact resulted from Mrs. Donner's bringing the
trust agreement with her into that state.
87. See note 35 supra.
88. See Casad, supra note 81, at 11; Currie, supra note 26, at 578-79; Com-
ment, supra note 81, at 683-86.
89. 16 Cal. 3d at 151, 545 P.2d at 269, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (emphasis
added).
90. See Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d
732 (1966). See also Currie, supra note 26, at 556-60.
91. 357 U.S. at 254.
92. At times, the factors of convenience and interests may be so compel-
ling that they compensate for a weaker link in the jurisdictional chain. In
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thermore, unlike Hanson, the Cornelison defendant had purposeful
contacts in the forum state. If Hanson is strictly interpreted, its
total disregard of convenience considerations would apply only to
situations in which purposeful activity within the state has not been
established.9 3 But once this jurisdictional threshold has been
crossed, the Hanson limitations are no longer controlling.9 4 Under
these circumstances, treating the questions of convenience 5 to-
gether with the interest of the plaintiff9 6 and the forum state9 7
this respect, these considerations may be viewed as expanding jurisdiction.
However, even in this situation, these factors must be supported to an ac-
ceptable level by the other Cornelison factors. Therefore, factors of con-
venience are never the principal justifications for exercising jurisdiction.
Rather they interact with the other requirements to strike the proper bal-
ance for making the exercise of jurisdiction fair and reasonable. See text
following note 76 supra.
93. In International Shoe, Traveler's Health, and McGee, the Supreme
Court considered the factors of convenience in reaching its jurisdic-
tional decisions. Indeed, in McGee, this was a most significant considera-
tion. The Hanson Court did not purport to overrule these cases. Rather,
it merely limited the seemingly unrestrained trend of jurisdictional growth
that followed. Therefore, considerations of convenience and interests re-
main viable jurisdictional factors when, as in International Shoe, Traveler's
Health, and McGee, at least a purposeful contact with the forum state has
been established.
94. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 899, 458
P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1969).
95. For a criticism of incorporating factors of convenience into the juris-
dictional equation rather than applying them only to forum non conveniens
considerations, see Morley, supra note 24.
96. A separate question is whether the convenience of the plaintiff is a
proper jurisdictional consideration. When the International Shoe Court re-
ferred to an "estimate of the inconveniences" (326 U.S. at 317) as applicable
in determining jurisdiction, it was speaking in terms of the defendant's
inconvenience, not of the plaintiff's. In McGee, however, the Court did
consider the interests of the plaintiff and noted that local "residents would
be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the [defendant]
to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable." 355 U.S. at 223.
Because McGee was not overturned by Hanson, the plaintiff's interests re-
main a usable ingredient in the jurisdictional formula. See Traveler's
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Phillips v. Anchor Hocking
Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966). See also Note, supra note
79, at 924.
97. The forum state's interest in providing its residents with a local tri-
bunal was implicitly recognized by the Hanson Court as a relevant factor
in the jurisdictional inquiry. The Court, in distinguishing Hanson from
McGee, noted that California had a specific statutory interest in bringing
the McGee defendant into the forum state: CAL. INs. CODE §§ 1610-11 (West
1972) subjected nonresident insurance corporations to California jurisdidtion
for actions based on insurance contracts with California residents. How-
ever, no such interest existed in Hanson. The logical inference is that if
a state manifests an interest in providing a local forum for its residents-
as jurisdictional factors would not offend due process 8
From the foregoing, it appears that the Cornelison decision is
constitutional. However the question remains whether its broad
implications, as evidenced by the Nebraska school teacher hypo-
thetical, are likewise constitutional. In the assumed fact situa-
tion, the three Cornelison factors, while differing in degree from
Cornelison, were nonetheless present. It is their presence that is
essential in establishing the constitutionality of jurisdiction; for, as
was seen in Cornelison, they distinguish the Cornelison approach
from Hanson and its limitations. Therefore, so long as the contin-
uous course of forum-state conduct, the rational nexus between the
forum-state activity and the cause of action, and the factors of con-
venience and interests are present and strike an acceptable balance,
the suggested variations of the Cornelison fact pattern seem also to
be of constitutional validity.
In summary, the Cornelison doctrine will apparently withstand
constitutional scrutiny. Moreover, the Cornelison approach is in
keeping with the spirit of International Shoe Co. v. Washington that
jurisdiction should not be determined according to some rigid
formula but rather on a case-by-case analysis to decide whether
exercising jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.
CONCLUSION
The Cornelison court, following the bold and liberal traditions
of the California Supreme Court, rejected the limited notion of
specific jurisdiction and extended California's long-arm reach. The
result of its efforts is a new jurisdictional approach that this
Comment has termed the Cornelison doctrine.
The Cornelison doctrine proposes that when neither the require-
ments of general jurisdiction nor the criteria of the traditional
concept of specific jurisdiction is met, a broader form of specific
jurisdiction may nonetheless be exercised. The plaintiff must first
establish that the defendant has engaged in a continuous course
of conduct within the forum state and that at least a rational nexus
exists between this conduct and the cause of action. If the defend-
ant is then unable to show that his inconvenience in defending in
and this interest need not be limited to special regulatory or statutory inter-
ests (see Currie, supra note 26, at 549)-this interest may be considered
in the jurisdictional determination process.
98. See Note, supra note 79, at 965. But see Kurland, supra note 79, at
620-21: "[Hanson] specifically rejects the notion of a parallel between
forum non conveniens and the appropriate forum under Due Process Clause
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the forum state would be significantly greater than the countervail-
ing interests of the plaintiff and the state in bringing him before
a local tribunal, jurisdiction may be exercised.
Although the impact of the doctrine can be seen as merely nudg-
ing the reach of specific jurisdiction into a somewhat wider orbit,
it is suggested that its scope is not so limited. Rather, the Corneli-
son doctrine should be viewed as a force that dislodges jurisdic-
tional law from its stagnant post-Hanson crevice into a much more
flexible approach based on the changing interrelationships among
the three Cornelison factors. Under this view, the Cornelison doc-
trine can be proclaimed as truly a significant development in juris-
dictional law.
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